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Abstract—The heterogeneous cellular network (HCN) is a
promising approach to the deployment of 5G cellular networks.
This paper comprehensively studies physical layer security in
a multi-tier HCN where base stations (BSs), authorized users
and eavesdroppers are all randomly located. We first propose
an access threshold based secrecy mobile association policy
that associates each user with the BS providing the maximum
truncated average received signal power beyond a threshold. Under
the proposed policy, we investigate the connection probability
and secrecy probability of a randomly located user, and provide
tractable expressions for the two metrics. Asymptotic analysis
reveals that setting a larger access threshold increases the
connection probability while decreases the secrecy probability.
We further evaluate the network-wide secrecy throughput and
the minimum secrecy throughput per user with both connection
and secrecy probability constraints. We show that introducing
a properly chosen access threshold significantly enhances the
secrecy throughput performance of a HCN.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, heterogeneous cellular
network, multi-antenna, artificial noise, secrecy throughput,
stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE deployment of heterogeneous cellular networks(HCNs) is a promising approach to providing seamless
wireless coverage and high network throughput in 5G mobile
communication. A HCN deploys a variety of infrastructure,
such as macro, pico, and femto base stations (BSs), as well as
fixed relay stations in different tiers [1]. BSs in different tiers
have different transmit powers and coverages. For example, a
macrocell uses the highest power to provide large coverage,
while a femtocell is usually a low-power home BS intended for
short-range communications. Due to the co-channel spectrum
sharing between different tiers, network interference in the
HCN is much more severe than that in a conventional single-
tier cellular network, thus posing a challenge to the successful
co-existence of tiers [2]. Therefore, one of the major chal-
lenges in deploying HCNs is to efficiently manage network
interference. Femtocell access control, using either closed
or open access, is an important mechanism for interference
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Fig. 1. A 3-tier macro/pico/femto HCN where authorized users coexist with
eavesdroppers.
management [3]. In closed access, femtocell access points
provide service only to the specified subscribers, whereas
arbitrary nearby users can use the femtocell in open access.
Xia et al. [2] point out that open access is preferred by
network operators, since it not only efficiently reduces cross-
tier interference, but also provides an inexpensive way to
expand network capacity.
However, due to the open system architecture of a HCN and
the broadcast nature of wireless communications, information
transmissions intended for authorized user equipments (UEs)
are more vulnerable to eavesdroppers (also named unautho-
rized users). As shown in Fig. 1, eavesdroppers (Eves) find it
easy to overhear legitimate communications. Therefore, secure
transmission is a significant concern when designing HCNs.
Unfortunately, the existing literature on HCNs has mainly
focused on network throughput and energy efficiency; little
of it has involved security issues.
Physical layer security (PLS), or, information-theoretic se-
curity, has drawn ever-increasing attention since Wyner’s sem-
inal research [4], where he introduced the degraded wiretap
channel model and defined the concept of secrecy capacity.
During the past decades, the wiretap channel model has been
generalized to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) channels [5]-
[7], cooperative relay channels [8]-[11], and two-way chan-
nels [12]-[14], etc. A large number of secrecy transmission
techniques and schemes have been proposed for wireless
communications (refer to [15] and its references).
2A. Related Works and Motivation
Early research on PLS has focused on point-to-point links
or single-cell scenarios. In some works, Eve’s channel state
information (CSI) is assumed to be perfectly known at the
transmitter, which is clearly not practical in real wiretap
scenarios, since Eves are usually passive. Without Eve’s CSI,
Goel et al. [16] proposed a multi-antenna transmission strategy
with artificial noise embedded into information signals to
confuse Eve. This method has become a popular approach to
enhance the PLS, and has attracted a stream of research, e.g.,
[17]-[19]. The idea of artificial noise has also been extended
to relay systems with jammers, in which cooperative jamming
techniques [14], [20], [21] have been proposed to improve
PLS. However, due to dynamic and large-scale wireless net-
work topologies, the spatial positions of network nodes and
propagation path losses become very critical factors influ-
encing secrecy performance, which unfortunately has been
considered by none of the above endeavors.
Recently, stochastic geometry theory has provided a pow-
erful tool to study the average behavior of a network by
modeling the positions of network nodes according to a
spatial distribution such as a Poisson point process (PPP)
[22]. Under a stochastic geometry framework, authors in [23]-
[26] studied the secure multi-antenna transmission against
PPP distributed Eves. More specifically, Zhou et al. [23]
evaluated the secure connectivity of two multi-antenna trans-
mission techniques: a directional antenna scheme and an
eigen-beamforming scheme. Zheng et al. [24] investigated the
average secrecy outage probability in a multi-input single-
output (MISO) wiretap channel for both non-colluding and
colluding Eves. Ghogho et al. [25] derived the probability of
a positive secrecy rate achieved by the artificial-noise method
in MIMO channels. Zheng et al. [26], [27] proposed both
dynamic and static parameter design schemes for the artificial-
noise-aided transmission to maximize secrecy throughput sub-
ject to a secrecy outage probability constraint.
Research on PLS has been further extended to ad hoc
networks [28], [29] and cellular networks [30], [31], where
the placement of transmitters and receivers are both modeled
as PPPs. Zhou, et al. [28], [29] considered single- and multi-
antenna transmissions in an ad hoc network, and provided
a tradeoff analysis between connectivity and secrecy, and
further measured the secrecy transmission capacity. Wang et
al. [30] evaluated the secrecy performance of cellular networks
considering the cell association and information exchange
between BSs, and provided tractable results for the achievable
secrecy rate under different assumptions on the information
of Eves’ locations. However, they only considered a single-
antenna case, ignoring both small-scale fading and inter-cell
interference. This work has been extended by [31], where
Geraci et al. investigated the average secrecy rate utilizing
the regularized channel inversion transmit precoding from a
perspective of massive MIMO systems.
Due to the multi-tier hierarchical architecture, HCNs bring
new challenges to the investigation of PLS compared with the
conventional single-tier topology [32]. In addition to cross-cell
interference, HCNs introduce severe cross-tier interference.
Both reliability and secrecy of data transmissions should be
taken into account, which makes analyzing the impact of
interference on both UEs and Eves much more complicated,
especially when system parameters differ between different
tiers. Besides, mobile terminals can access an arbitrary tier,
e.g., open access, which calls for specific mobile association
policies that consider both quality of service (QoS) and
secrecy.
A very recent contribution [33] considered PLS in a two-tier
heterogeneous network with one Eve wiretapping macrocell
users. We point out that, the authors in [33] focused on the
design/optimization of secrecy beamforming, but not from
the perspective of network analysis and deployment. Their
conclusions are based on the idealized assumption that the CSI
of the Eve is perfectly available. Moreover, they considered
neither the multi-Eve wiretap scenarios, nor the random spatial
positions of network nodes and the large-scale path loss. To the
best of our knowledge, no prior work has accounted for PLS
when designing HCNs, and a fundamental analysis framework
to evaluate the secrecy performance in HCNs is lacking, which
has motivated our work.
B. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we extend PLS to a K-tier HCN where
the positions of BSs, UEs and Eves are all modeled as
independent homogeneous PPPs. We provide a comprehensive
performance analysis of artificial-noise-aided multi-antenna
secure transmission under a stochastic geometry framework.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
i) We propose a secrecy mobile association policy based on
the truncated average received signal power (ARSP). Specif-
ically, a typical UE is only permitted to associate with the BS
providing the highest ARSP; if the highest ARSP is below a
pre-set access threshold, the UE remains inactive. We derive
closed-form expressions for the tier association probability for
this policy (the probability that a tier is associated with the
typical UE) and the BS activation probability (the probability
that a BS associates at least one UE), which are essential to
analyze the key performance metrics.
ii) We analyze the connection probability of a randomly
located UE, which is defined as the probability that the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the UE lies above a
target SINR. We derive a new accurate integral representation
of the connection probability and an analytically tractable
expression under the interference-limited case. An asymptotic
analysis of the connection probability reveals that setting a
larger access threshold is beneficial for improving link quality.
iii) We analyze the user secrecy probability, which is defined
as the probability that the SINR of an arbitrary Eve lies
below a SINR threshold. We derive analytical upper and lower
bounds for the secrecy probability, which are close to the
exact values in the high secrecy probability region. We find
that the access threshold, BS density and power allocation
ratio respectively displays a tradeoff between the connection
and secrecy probabilities, and that these parameters should be
carefully designed to balance link quality and secrecy.
iv) We investigate network-wide secrecy throughput subject
to connection and secrecy probability constraints. We derive
3closed-form expressions for the rate of redundant information
in small-antenna and large-antenna cases, respectively. We
further evaluate the minimum per user secrecy throughput.
We show that, compared with non-threshold mobile access,
our threshold-based policy can significantly increase secrecy
throughout when the access threshold is properly chosen.
Leveraging the obtained analytical expressions, we provide
various tractable predictions of network performance and
guidelines for future network designs. For instance, setting a
larger access threshold helps to improve link quality. However,
if we aim to increase network-wide secrecy throughput, we
should properly choose the access threshold, but not set it as
large as possible.
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model. In Sections III and
IV, we investigate the connection probability and secrecy prob-
ability, respectively. In Section V, we evaluate the network-
wide secrecy throughput. In Section VI, we conclude our work.
Notations: bold uppercase (lowercase) letters denote ma-
trices (column vectors). (·)†, (·)T, | · |, ‖ · ‖, P{·}, and
EA(·) denote conjugate, transpose, absolute value, Euclidean
norm, probability, and expectation with respect to (w.r.t.)
A, respectively. CN (µ, σ2), Exp(λ) and Γ(N, λ) denote the
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2, exponential distribution with parameter λ,
and gamma distribution with parameters N and λ, respectively.
Rm×n and Cm×n denote the m×n real and complex number
domains, respectively. log(·) and ln(·) denote the base-2 and
natural logarithms, respectively. fV (·) and FV (·) denote the
probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of a random variable V , respectively. B(o, r)
describes a disk with center o and radius r. Bz,k and Ux
(Ex) represent a BS at location z in tier k and a UE (Eve)
at location x, respectively. [x]+ , max(x, 0) with x a real
number. Cα,m ,
Γ(m−1+ 2α )Γ(1− 2α )
Γ(m−1) for m ≥ 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a K-tier HCN where the BSs in different
tiers have different operating parameters (e.g., transmit power
and antenna numbers), while those in the same tier share
the same parameters. Define K , {1, 2, · · · ,K}. In tier k,
the BSs are spatially distributed according to a homogeneous
PPP Φk with density λk in a two-dimensional plane R2. As
depicted in Fig. 1, there coexist UEs and Eves, where the
UEs are legitimate destinations while the Eves are wiretappers
attempting to intercept the secret information intended for the
UEs. The locations of the UEs and Eves are characterized by
two independent homogeneous PPPs Φu and Φe with densities
λu and λe, respectively.
A. Channel Model
Wireless channels in the HCN are assumed to undergo
flat Rayleigh fading together with a large-scale path loss
governed by the exponent α > 2 1. Each BS in tier k has Mk
antennas, and UEs and Eves are each equipped with a single
antenna. The channel from Bz,k to Ux or Ex is characterized
by hzxr
−α2
zx , where hzx ∈ CMk×1 denotes the small-scale
fading vector with independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) entries hzx,j ∼ CN (0, 1), and rzx denotes the path
distance. The noise at each receive node is nx ∼ CN (0, N0).
We assume that each BS knows the CSIs of its associated UEs.
Since each Eve passively receives signals, its CSI is unknown,
whereas its channel statistics information is available2.
B. Wyner’s Wiretap Code
We utilize the well-known Wyner’s wiretap encoding
scheme [4] to encode secret information. Let Rt,k and Re,k
denote respectively the rates of the transmitted codewords and
redundant information (to protect from eavesdropping) for tier
k, and Rs,k = Rt,k−Re,k denotes the secrecy rate. Consider
a typical legitimate BS-UE pair in tier k. If the channel from
the BS to the UE can support the rate Rt,k, the UE is able to
decode the secret messages, which corresponds to a reliable
connection event. If none of the channels from the BS to the
Eves can support the redundant rate Re,k , the information is
deemed to be protected against wiretapping, i.e., secrecy is
achieved [29].
C. Artificial-Noise-Aided Transmission
To deliberately confuse Eves while guaranteeing reliable
links to UEs, each BS employs the artificial-noise-aided
transmission strategy [16]. The transmitted signal of Bz,k is
designed in the form of
xz =
√
φkPkwzsz +
√
(1− φk)PkWzvz, z ∈ Φk, (1)
where sz is the information-bearing signal with E[|sz |2] =
1, vz ∈ C(Mk−1)×1 is an artificial noise vector with i.i.d.
entries vz,i ∼ CN
(
0, 1Mk−1
)
, and φk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
power allocation ratio of the information signal power to the
total transmit power Pk. wz = h†z/‖hz‖ is the beamforming
vector for the served UE, with hz the corresponding channel.
Wz ∈ CMk×(Mk−1) is a weight matrix for the artificial noise,
and the columns of W , [wz Wz] constitute an orthogonal
basis.
D. Secrecy Mobile Association Policy
We consider an open-access system where each UE is
allowed to be served by a BS from an arbitrary tier, and it
is associated with the tier that provides the largest ARSP.
For an arbitrary UE, the ARSP related to tier k is defined
as Pˆk , PkMkr
−α
k , where rk denotes the distance from the
UE to the nearest BS in tier k. To avoid access with too low an
ARSP, we propose a truncated ARSP based mobile association
policy, where we introduce an access threshold τ , and only
1The analysis of different α’s in different tiers can be performed in a similar
way, which is omitted in this paper for tractability.
2This assumption is very generic and has been extensively adopted in the
literature on PLS, e.g., [16]-[18], [23]-[31].
4Fig. 2. An illustration of our mobile association policy in a 2-tier HCN.
A UE connects to the BS providing the highest ARSP instead of the nearest
BS. Those UEs outside the serving regions of BSs can not be served. A BS
remains idle if it has no UE to serve.
allow those UEs with ARSPs larger than τ to be associated.
Mathematically, the truncated ARSP is defined as
Pˆk =
{
PkMkr
−α
k , rk ≤ Dk,
0, rk > Dk,
(2)
where Dk =
(
PkMk
τ
) 1
α denotes the radius of the serving
region of an arbitrary BS in tier k, and the index of the tier
to which the considered UE is associated is determined by
n∗ = argmax
k∈K
Pˆk. (3)
Our mobile association policy is illustrated in Fig. 2, where
the serving region of a BS has been clearly shown. Due
to tiers having different operating parameters, the average
coverage regions of each cell do not correspond to a standard
Voronoi tessellation, but closely resemble a circular Dirichlet
tessellation [34]. It is worth mentioning that compared to
conventional non-threshold association policies, our threshold-
based policy benefits secrecy in the following two aspects:
1) It restrains a BS from associating the UEs outside its
serving region (the ARSP outside the serving region is always
inferior to that inside), such that not only a good link quality
can be guaranteed but also more power can be used to transmit
artificial noise to degrade the wiretap channels.
2) If a BS serves no UE, it is kept idle in order to reduce
both intra- and cross-tier interference. Therefore, the link
quality for the active BSs consequently improves, which has
the potential of increasing secrecy rates or secrecy throughput.
The proposed mobile association policy is quite applica-
ble to the HCN with secrecy requirements. We will see in
subsequent analysis that τ plays a critical role in secrecy
transmissions. Before going into the analysis, we first define
and compute tier association probability [37] and BS acti-
vation probability, which are essential for analyzing our key
performance metrics in the sequel.
For ease of notation, we define δ , 2/α, Ξ ,∑
j∈K λj(PjMj)
δ
, and Cj,k , CjCk , ∀C ∈ {P,M, λ, φ}.
Recalling (3), the association probability of tier k is math-
ematically defined as
Sk , P{n∗ = k} = P{Pˆk > Pˆj , ∀j ∈ K \ k}. (4)
It has a closed-form expression provided by the following
lemma.
Lemma 1: The association probability of tier k is given by
Sk = λk(PkMk)δΞ−1
(
1− e−πτ−δΞ
)
. (5)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
From Lemma 1, we make the following three observations:
1) Tiers with large BS densities, high transmit power, and
more BS antennas are more likely to have UEs associated with
them. When tier k has a much larger λk , Pk , or Mk than other
tiers, Sk can be approximated by 1−e−πD2kλk , and converges
to one as λk (Pk or Mk) goes to infinity.
2) Due to the restriction of τ , an arbitrary UE has a
probability S =∑k∈K Sk = 1− e−πτ−δΞ of being associated
with a BS, which implies it has probability e−πτ−δΞ of being
idle. This differs from a non-threshold mobile association
policy [37] which always associates a UE with a tier.
3) Each BS can associate with multiple UEs, and the average
number of UEs per BS in tier k, i.e., cell load, is Nk = λuλk Sk(see [37, Lemma 2]).
We assume that a BS utilizes time division multiple access
(TDMA) to efficiently eliminate intra-cell interference. Due
to the overlap of serving regions among cells and different
biases towards admitting UEs, even if a BS has UEs located
within its serving region, it is inactive when all these UEs are
associated with the other BSs (see the idle BS in Fig. 2). We
define the BS activation probability of tier k as
Ak , P{A BS in tier k associates with at least one UE}.
(6)
It has a closed-form expression given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The BS activation probability of tier k is given
by
Ak = 1− exp
(
−λu(PkMk)δΞ−1
(
1− e−πτ−δΞ
))
. (7)
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
The BS activation probability is important for analyzing
HCNs since the level of intra- and cross-tier interferences
depends heavily on it. Although some empirical approxi-
mations of the BS activation probability have been given
for conventional cellular networks, e.g., [40], they do not
apply to HCNs. Therefore, our derivation of the BS activation
probability is essential for our analysis.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain Ak = 1−e−
λu
λk
Sk
. Obvi-
ously, BSs with higher power and more antennas have higher
activation probabilities. Since λuλk Sk monotonically decreases
in λk (see (5)), it is easy to prove that Ak is a monotonically
decreasing function of λk , which indicates that deploying more
cells results in a smaller BS activation possibility. On the
contrary, introducing more UEs (a larger λu) increases Ak.
We can also readily prove that both Sk and Ak decrease in τ ,
just as validated in Fig. 3. The set of active BSs in tier k is a
thinning of Φk, denoted by Φok, with density λok = Akλk. We
have the following property w.r.t. the new λok.
Property 1: λok monotonically increases in λk, and tends to
λu as λk goes to infinity.
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Fig. 3. Tier association probability and BS activation probability in a 2-tier
HCN vs. λ2 for different τ (dBm)’s.
Proof: Pleas see Appendix C.
This property indicates that although deploying more cells
results in smaller BS activation probabilities, it actually in-
creases the number of active BSs. We emphasize that many
existing works, e.g., [34], [37], implicitly assume that all BSs
are activated, which is not appropriate mathematically, since
the total number of active BSs is limited by the number of UEs
under a one-to-one service mode. This inevitably leads to an
inaccurate evaluation of network performance. In this paper,
the BS activation probability is taken into consideration, and
λok < λu strictly holds, which is more realistic compared with
[34], [37].
In the following sections, we provide a comprehensive anal-
ysis of PLS in HCNs incorporating the connection probability,
secrecy probability, and network-wide secrecy throughput,
respectively. We stress that, due to secrecy considerations, the
analysis is fundamentally different from the existing works
without secrecy constraints. By deriving various analytical
expressions for our performance metrics, we aim to provide
tractable predictions of network performance and guidelines
for future network designs.
III. USER CONNECTION PROBABILITY
In this section, we investigate the connection probability of
a randomly located UE. Here connection probability corre-
sponds to the probability that a secret message is decoded by
this UE.
Without lose of generality, we consider a typical UE located
at the origin o and served by Bb,k. In addition to the desired
information signal from the serving BS Bb,k, Uo receives
interference consisting of both undesired information signals
and artificial noise from the BSs 1) in tier k (except for Bb,k),
and 2) in all the other tiers. The received signal at Uo is given
by
yo =
√
φkPkh
T
b wbsb
R
α/2
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
information signal
+
∑
j∈K
∑
z∈Φoj\b
√
φjPjh
T
zowzsz +
√
(1 − φj)PjhTzoWzvz
r
α/2
zo︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra− and cross−tier interference (signal and artificial noise)
+no,
(8)
where Rk represents the distance between Uo and Bb,k.
A. General Result
The connection probability of Uo associated with tier k is
defined as the probability of the event that the instantaneous
SINR of Uo exceeds or equals a target SINR βt, i.e.,
Pc,k , P{SINRo,k ≥ βt}, (9)
where SINRo,k is given by
SINRo,k =
φkPk‖hb‖2R−αk∑
j∈K Ijo +N0
, (10)
with Ijo =
∑
z∈Φoj\b
φjPj(|hTzowz|2+ξj‖hTzoWz‖2)
rαzo
and ξj ,
φ−1j −1
Mj−1 . We note from (3) that there should be an exclusion
region B
(
o, (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α Rk
)
around Uo for tier j ∈ K; all
interfering BSs in tier j are located outside of this region.
Let Io =
∑
j∈K Ijo and s ,
Rαk βt
φkPk
. Pc,k can be calculated
by substituting (10) into (9)
Pc,k = ERkEIo
[
P
{‖hb‖2 ≥ s(Io +N0)}]
(a)
= ERkEIo
[
e−s(Io+N0)
Mk−1∑
m=0
sm(Io +N0)
m
m!
]
=
Mk−1∑
m=0
ERkEIo
[
e−sN0
m∑
p=0
(
m
p
)
Nm−p0 s
me−sIo
m!
Ipo
]
(b)
=
Mk−1∑
m=0
ERk
[
e−sN0
m∑
p=0
(
m
p
)
(−1)pNm−p0 sm
m!
L(p)Io (s)
]
,
(11)
where (a) holds for ‖hb‖2 ∼ Γ(Mk, 1), and (b) is obtained
from [38, Theorem 1] with L(p)Io (s) the p-order derivative of
the Laplace transform LIo(s) evaluated at s.
The major difficulty in calculating Pc,k is calculating
L(p)Io (s). Zhang et al. [29], [39] derived a closed-form expres-
sion of L(p)Io (s) for ad hoc networks. In an ad hoc network,
interfering nodes can be arbitrarily close to the desired re-
ceiver, which however is not possible in a cellular network. As
mentioned above, with mobile association in cellular networks,
interfering BSs are always located outside a certain region
around the desired UE. For the cellular model, Li et al.
[40] proposed a useful approach to handle L(p)Io (s) by first
expressing it in a recursive form, and then transforming it
into a lower triangular Toeplitz matrix form. This yields a
6tractable expression of the connection probability for multi-
antenna transmissions in cellular networks.
The analysis of the PLS in HCNs is quite different from [40]
where only a single-tier network without secrecy demands is
considered. In addition, due to the difficulty in deriving the dis-
tribution of the interference signal along with artificial noise,
the derivation of L(p)Io (s) becomes much more complicated.
Fortunately, we provide an accurate integral form of Pc,k in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The connection probability of a typical UE
associated with tier k is given by
Pc,k = πλkSk
Mk−1∑
i=0
Mk−1∑
m=0
m∑
p=0(
βtN0
φkPk
)m−p Zk,m,p,i
i!(m− p)!Θ
i
Mk
(p+ 1, 1), (12)
where Zk,m,p,i =
∫ D2k
0
xi+
α
2 (m−p)e−
βtN0
φkPk
x
α
2 −πΥkxdx, and
Υk =
∑
j∈K λj (Pj,kMj,k)
δ
{
1 − Aj +
(
φj,kβt
Mj,k
)δ
AjΥj1 +
δMj,k
φj,kβt
AjΥj2
}
, with
Υj1 =


Cα,Mj+1, ξj = 1,
Cα,2
(1−ξj)Mj−1 −
Mj−2∑
n=0
ξ1+δj Cα,n+2
(1−ξj)Mj−1−n , ξj 6= 1,
(13)
and Υj2 shown in (14) at the top of this page. 2F1(·) denotes
the Gauss hypergeometric function, and ΘiM (p, q) denotes the
row-p-column-q entry of ΘiM , where ΘM is a Toeplitz matrix
ΘM ,


0
g1 0
g2 g1 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
gM−1 gM−2 · · · g1 0

 , (15)
with gi = πδi−δ
∑
j∈KAjλj (Pj,kMj,k)δ
(
φj,kβt
Mj,k
)i
Qj,i where
Qj,i is shown in (16) at the top of this page.
Proof: Please see Appendix D.
Although (12) seems to be rather unwieldy due to the inte-
gral term Zk,m,p,i and 2F1(·), it is actually easy to compute.
Theorem 1 provides a general and accurate expression for
the connection probability without requiring time-consuming
Monte Carlo simulations. It also provides a baseline for com-
parison with other approximate results. It appears impossible
to extract main properties of the connection probability from
(12), thus motivating the need for more compact forms.
B. Interference-limited HCN
Due to ubiquitous interference in the HCN, the interference
at a receiver apparently dominates thermal noise. Therefore, it
is reasonable for us to consider the interference-limited case
by ignoring thermal noise, i.e., N0 = 0. In this case, the
connection probability (9) simplifies to
P intc,k =
Mk−1∑
m=0
ERk
[
(−1)msm
m!
L(m)Io (s)
]
, (17)
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with a more analytically tractable expression of P intc,k provided
by the following corollary.
Corollary 1: For the interference-limited HCN, the connec-
tion probability of a UE associated with tier k is
P intc,k =
λk
Sk
Mk−1∑
m=0
∥∥ΘmMk∥∥1
πmΥm+1k
(
1−
m∑
l=0
πle−πΥkD
2
k
l!D−2lk Υ
−l
k
)
, (18)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1 induced matrix norm, i.e., ‖A‖1 =
max1≤j≤N
∑M
i=1 |Aij | for A ∈ RM×N .
Proof: Please see Appendix E.
Corollary 1 provides a much simpler expression for
the connection probability than (12). Note that the term∑m
l=0
πle−πΥkD
2
k
l!D−2lk Υ
−l
k
in (18) is a consequence of τ 6= 0. This term
goes to zero as τ → 0 (i.e., non-threshold mobile association)
since limτ→0Dk → ∞. As shown in Fig. 4, Pc,k and P intc,k
nearly merge, and in the subsequent analysis we focus on the
latter for convenience.
C. Asymptotic Analysis on P intc,k
It is important for network design to understand how P intc,k
is affected by system parameters such as τ , Pk, λk and
λu, etc. Since Υk and ΘMk in (18) are coupled through
these parameters in a very complicated way, the relationship
between them is generally not explicit. In the following, we
provide some insights into the behavior of P intc,k w.r.t. the above
parameters by performing an asymptotic analysis, with the
corresponding proof relegated to Appendix F.
Property 2: For the case that all tiers share the same
number of BS antennas M and power allocation ratio φ,
and λu ≫ λj , ∀j ∈ K, P intc,k converges to a value that is
independent of the transmit power Pj , BS density λj and
k ∈ K as τ → 0.
Property 3: P intc,k → 1 as τ →∞ for k ∈ K.
Property 4: When the transmit power of tier 1 is much
larger than that of the other tiers, P intc,k increases with τ and
λl, ∀l 6= 1, and decreases with λu, ∀k ∈ K.
7Υj2 =


(
Mj,k
φj,kβt
)Mj−1 2F1(Mj ,Mj+δ;Mj+δ+1;− Mj,kφj,kβt )
Mj+δ
, ξj = 1,
2F1
(
1,δ+1;δ+2;− Mj,kφj,kβt
)
1+δ(1−ξj)Mj−1 −
Mj−2∑
n=0
(
Mj,k
ξjφj,kβt
)n 2F1(n+1,n+1+δ;n+2+δ;− Mj,kξjφj,kβt )
(n+1+δ)(1−ξj)Mj−1−n , ξj 6= 1,
(14)
Qj,i =


(
Mj+i−1
Mj−1
)
2F1
(
Mj + i, i− δ; i− δ + 1;−φj,kβtMj,k
)
, ξj = 1,
2F1
(
i+1,i−δ;i−δ+1;− φj,kβtMj,k
)
−
Mj−2∑
n=0
(n+in )
ξ
i+1
j
(1−ξj)
n 2F1
(
n+i+1,i−δ;i−δ+1;− ξjφj,kβtMj,k
)
(1−ξj)Mj−1 , ξj 6= 1,
(16)
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Fig. 5. Connection probability in a 2-tier HCN vs. λ2 for different λu’s, with
α = 4, {P1, P2} = {30, 10}dBm, {M1,M2} = {6, 4}, λ1 = 1pi4002m2 ,
τ = −90dBm, βt = 5, and {φ1, φ2} = {1, 0.5}.
Property 5: When Pj,1 ≪ 1, ∀j 6= 1, P intc,k decreases with
P1, and converges to a constant value as P1 →∞, ∀k ∈ K.
Property 2 shows that under a loose control on mobile
access (τ → 0) with {Mj} = M and {φj} = φ, the connec-
tion probability becomes insensitive to transmit power and BS
densities, i.e., increasing transmit power or randomly adding
new infrastructure does not influence connection performance
(link quality). This insensitivity property obtained for this
special case is also observed in a single-antenna unbiased HCN
[34], [37].
Property 3 implies that increasing τ increases connection
probability, just as explained in Sec. II-D. Nevertheless, τ
should not be set as large as possible in practice. As will
be observed later in Sec. VI, τ should be properly chosen to
achieve a good secrecy throughput performance under certain
connection constraints.
Properties 2 and 3 are validated in Fig. 4. We find that
both P intc,1 and P intc,2 increase with M1. The reason is that, on
one hand a larger M1 produces a higher diversity gain, and
improves the link quality for tier 1. On the other hand, a larger
M1 also provides a stronger bias towards admitting UEs, thus
the UE originally associated with tier 2 under low link quality
(e.g., at the edge of a cell in tier 2) now connects to tier 1,
which as a consequence enhances the link quality of tier 2.
Property 4 provides some interesting counter-intuitive in-
sights into connection performance. For instance, deploying
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more pico/femto BSs may improve connection probabilities.
This is because a larger λl decreases the number of active
BSs in the other tiers, which reduces the aggregate network
interference especially when the transmit power of the other
tiers is large. However, the connection probability decreases
when more UEs are introduced, since more BSs are now
activated, resulting in greater interference. Although Property
4 is obtained as Pj,1 → 0, it applies more generally, as
illustrated in Fig. 5. We see that, a larger λu decreases P intc,k
for k = 1, 2. In addition, we observe that, when λuλ2 ≤ 50, a
larger λ2 increases P intc,k , whereas when λuλ2 > 50, it decreasesP intc,k . The underlying reason is that, in the latter both A1
and A2 nearly reach one, hence deploying more microcells
significantly increases interference, which deteriorates link
reliability. Nevertheless, this performance degradation can be
effectively mitigated by setting a larger access threshold, since
in this way more BSs remain idle, alleviating the network
interference.
Property 5 implies that as P1 increases, P intc,1 first increases
and then decreases, and eventually levels off. Increasing trans-
mit power is not always beneficial to connection performance,
since the growth of signal power is counter-balanced by the
growth of interference power. The same is true for P intc,j ,
∀j 6= 1. The underlying reason is that, as P1 gets larger,A1 in-
creases while Aj decreases, which increases interference from
tier 1 while reducing that from the other K − 1 tiers. When
8P1 is relatively small, the decrement of interference from the
other K − 1 tiers dominates the increment of interference
from tier 1, so the aggregate interference actually reduces;
the opposite occurs as P1 further increases. This property
is confirmed in Fig. 6. We also find that, for a given P1,
P intc,2 increases significantly with φ2, while P intc,1 experiences
negligible impact since the inference in tier 1 varies little.
Even though, we still observe a slight improvement in P intc,1
in the small P1 region as φ2 increases. This occurs because
focusing more power on the desired UE in tier 2 to some
degree decreases the residual interference (artificial noise and
leaked signal) to the UE associated with tier 1. However, the
reduced interference becomes negligible as P1 increases, and
P intc,1 becomes insensitive to φ2.
IV. USER SECRECY PROBABILITY
In this section, we investigate the secrecy probability of a
randomly located UE. Here secrecy probability corresponds to
the probability that a secret message is not decoded by any
Eve.
When accounting for secrecy demands, we should not
underestimate the wiretap capability of Eves. In our work,
we consider a worst-case wiretap scenario in which Eves are
assumed to have the capability of multiuser decoding (e.g.,
successive interference cancellation), thus the interference
created by concurrent transmission of information signals can
be completely resolved [29]. Therefore, Eves only receive the
artificial noise from all BSs in the HCN. The received signal
at Ee is given by
ye =
√
φkPkh
T
bewbsb
r
α/2
be︸ ︷︷ ︸
information signal
+
√
(1− φk)PkhTbeWbvb
r
α/2
be︸ ︷︷ ︸
serving−BS artificial noise
+
∑
j∈K
∑
z∈Φoj\b
√
(1− φj)PjhTzeWzvz
r
α/2
ze︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra− and cross−tier artificial noise
+ne. (19)
We consider the non-colluding wiretap scenario where each
Eve individually decodes secret messages. In that case, trans-
mission is secure only if secrecy is achieved against all Eves.
Accordingly, the secrecy probability of tier k is defined as
the probability of the event that the instantaneous SINR of an
arbitrary Eve falls below a target SINR βe, i.e.,
Ps,k ,EΦ1 · · ·EΦKEΦe[ ∏
e∈Φe
P {SINRe,k < βe|Φe,Φ1, · · · ,ΦK}
]
, (20)
where SINRe,k is given by
SINRe,k =
φkPk|hTbewb|2r−αbe
Ibe +
∑
j∈K Ije +N0
, ∀e ∈ Φe, (21)
with Ibe , (1−φk)Pk|h
T
beWb|2
(Mk−1)rαbe and Ije ,∑
z∈Φoj\b
(1−φj)Pj‖hTzeWz‖2
(Mj−1)rαze . Unfortunately, it is intractable
to derive an exact expression for Ps,k from (20). Instead, we
provide the upper and lower bounds of Ps,k in the following
theorem as done in [28] and [29].
Theorem 2: The secrecy probability Ps,k in (20) satisfies
PLs,k ≤ Ps,k ≤ PUs,k, (22)
where
PLs,k = exp
(
− πλe
(1 + ξkβe)
Mk−1
∫ ∞
0
e
− βeN0φkPk r
α
2 −πψkβδerdr
)
,
(23)
PUs,k = 1−
πλe
(1 + ξkβe)
Mk−1
∫ ∞
0
e
− βeN0φkPk r
α
2 −πψkβδer−πλerdr,
(24)
with ψk ,
∑
j∈KAjλjCα,Mj (ξjφj,kPj,k)δ.
Proof: Please see Appendix G.
Interestingly, when λe ≪ 1, the two bounds merge, i.e.,
PLs,k ≈ Pos,k := 1−
πλe
∫∞
0
e
− βeN0φkPk r
α
2 −πψkβδerdr
(1 + ξkβr,k)
Mk−1 ≈ P
U
s,k,
(25)
and Pos,k → 1 as λe → 0. It implies that as Ps,k → 1, both
the upper and lower bounds approach the exact value. In other
words, Ps,k can be approximated by Pos,k in the high secrecy
probability region.
For some special cases, the calculation for the upper and
lower bounds can be simplified. For example, substituting α =
4 into Theorem 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2: When α = 4, the secrecy probability of tier k
Pα=4s,k satisfies
PL,α=4s,k ≤ Pα=4s,k ≤ PU,α=4s,k , (26)
where
PL,α=4so = exp

− π 12 λee
ψ2
k
β2δe
γk
√
γk (1 + ξkβe)
Mk−1
(
1− Ω
(
ψkβ
δ
e√
γk
)) ,
(27)
PU,α=4s,k = 1−
π
1
2λee
(λe+ψkβ
δ
e )
2
γk
√
γk (1 + ξkβe)
Mk−1
(
1− Ω
(
λe + ψkβ
δ
e√
γk
))
,
(28)
with Ω(x) , 1√
π
∫ x2
0
e−t√
t
dt and γk , 4βeN0π2φkPk .
From Corollary 2, an approximation for Pα=4s,k in the high
secrecy probability region is
Po,α:=4s,k = 1−
π
1
2 λee
ψ2kβ
2δ
e
γk
√
γk (1 + ξkβe)
Mk−1
(
1− Ω
(
ψkβ
δ
e√
λk
))
.
(29)
Substituting N0 = 0 into Theorem 2, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3: For an interference-limited HCN, the secrecy
probability of tier k P ints,k satisfies
P int,Ls,k ≤ P ints,k ≤ P int,Us,k , (30)
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where
P int,Ls,k = exp
(
−λeψ−1k β−δe (1 + ξkβe)1−Mk
)
, (31)
P int,Us,k = 1−
λe
λe + ψkβδe
(1 + ξkβe)
1−Mk . (32)
Corollary 3 provides an approximation for P ints,k in the high
secrecy probability region as
P int,os,k := 1− λeψ−1k β−δe (1 + ξkβe)1−Mk . (33)
Next we establish some properties on P int,os,k , with their
corresponding proofs relegated to Appendix H.
Property 6: P int,os,k monotonically decreases in λe, τ , and
φj , ∀j ∈ K, and it increases in λu.
Property 7: When Mj,k ≪ 1, ∀j ∈ K \ k, P int,os,k increases
in Mk, and decreases in λk .
Property 8: In the high Pk region, P int,os,j , ∀j ∈ K,
increases in Pk; P int,os,k converges to a constant value as
Pk →∞ and limPk→∞ P int,os,l = 1, ∀l 6= k.
Properties 6-8 provide insights into the secrecy probability
that differ from those obtained about the connection prob-
ability. For example, deploying more pico/femto BSs may
increase connection probabilities while reducing the secrecy
probability, which implies that proper BS densities should
be designed to balance link quality and secrecy. The above
properties are further validated by the following numerical
examples.
Fig. 7 depicts secrecy probability versus P1 for different
values of τ . We see that, the lower bound accurately approxi-
mates the simulated value, while the upper bound becomes
asymptotically tight in the high secrecy probability region.
As P1 increases, P ints,1 first decreases and then slowly rises
to a constant value that is independent of P1. P ints,2 reaches
one as Pk becomes large enough, verifying Property 8. We
observe that, the secrecy probabilities of both tiers increase as
τ decreases, while Table I shows that connection probabilities
decrease as τ decreases, as indicated in Property 2. The access
threshold τ displays a tradeoff between the connection and se-
crecy probabilities. This is because a smaller τ results in more
TABLE I
Connection Probability vs. Secrecy Probability
Probabilities Pintc,1 Pintc,2 Pints,1 Pints,2
τ = −70dBm 0.9571 0.9477 0.9786 0.9930
τ = −90dBm 0.9186 0.9073 0.9799 0.9936
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Power Allocation Ratio, φ2
C
on
n
ec
ti
on
an
d
S
ec
re
cy
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
φ1 = 0.5
φ1 = 0.7
φ1 = 0.9
P intc,2
P int,Ls,2
Fig. 8. Connection probability in (18) and secrecy probability in (31) in a
2-tier HCN vs. φ2 for different φ1’s, with α = 4, {P1, P2} = {30, 20}dBm,
{M1,M2} = {6, 4}, λ1 =
1
pi4002m2
, {λ2, λu, λe} = {2, 4, 0.5}λ1, βt =
2, βe = 1, and τ = −90dBm.
interference, which simultaneously degrades the legitimate and
wiretap channels. In other words, network interference is a
double-edged sword that promotes the secrecy transmission
but in turn restrains the legitimate communication.
In Fig. 8, we see that as φ2 increases, i.e., more power is
allocated to the information signal, P intc,2 increases and P ints,2
decreases. We should design the power allocation to strike
a better balance between reliability and secrecy. In addition,
although a smaller φ1 rarely affects P intc,2 , it significantly
increases P ints,2 , which highlights the validity of the artificial-
noise method.
V. NETWORK-WIDE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
In this section, we investigate the network-wide secrecy
throughput of the HCN, in terms of the secrecy transmission
capacity [28], [29], which is defined as the achievable rate
of successful transmission of secret messages per unit area
subject to both connection and secrecy probability constraints.
Mathematically, the network-wide secrecy throughput, with a
connection probability constraint Pc,k(βt,k) = ̺ and a secrecy
probability constraint Ps,k(βe,k) = ǫ for k ∈ K, is given by
T =
∑
k∈K
λkAk̺R∗s,k =
∑
k∈K
λkAk̺
[R∗t,k −R∗e,k]+
=
∑
k∈K
λkAk̺
[
log
(
1 + β∗t,k
1 + β∗e,k
)]+
, (34)
where R∗s,k =
[
R∗t,k −R∗e,k
]+
, R∗t,k = log(1 + β∗t,k) and
R∗e,k = log(1+β∗e,k) are the secrecy, codeword and redundant
rates for tier k, with β∗t,k and β∗e,k the unique roots of the
equations Pc,k(βt,k) = ̺ and Ps,k(βe,k) = ǫ, respectively.
Note that, if R∗t,k − R∗e,k is negative, the connection and
10
secrecy probability constraints can not be satisfied simultane-
ously, and transmissions should be suspended. When system
designers can control the connection and secrecy probability
constraints, (34) can be used to find the optimal values of ̺
and ǫ to maximize T . In the following, we calculate β∗t,k and
β∗e,k from Pc,k(βt,k) = ̺ and Ps,k(βe,k) = ǫ, respectively.
For convenience, we consider an interference-limited HCN.
Due to the complicated expression of P intc,k in (18), we are
unable to derive an expression for β∗t,k from P intc,k (βt,k) =
̺. However, since P intc,k (βt,k) is obviously a monotonically
decreasing function of βt,k, we can efficiently calculate β∗t,k
that satisfies P intc,k (βt,k) = ̺ using the bisection method.
To guarantee a high level of secrecy, the secrecy probability
ǫ must be large, which allows us to use (33) to calculate β∗e,k.
For the case Mk ≥ 3, we can only numerically calculate
β∗e,k that satisfies P ints,k (βe,k) = ǫ using the bisection method.
Fortunately, when Mk = 2 or Mk ≫ 1, we can provide closed-
form expressions of β∗e,k, with corresponding proof relegated
to Appendix I.
Proposition 1: In the large ǫ regime with α = 4 and Mk =
2, the root of P ints,k (βe,k) = ǫ is given by
βoe,k =

 3
( √
ξkλe
2(1−ǫ)ψk +
√
ξkλ2e
4(1−ǫ)2ψ2k
+ 127
)2/3
− 1
3
√
ξk
( √
ξkλe
2(1−ǫ)ψk +
√
ξkλ2e
4(1−ǫ)2ψ2k
+ 127
)1/3


2
.
(35)
Proposition 2: In the large ǫ regime, as Mk →∞, the root
of P ints,k (βe,k) = ǫ is given by
β⋆e,k = δ
φk
1− φk ln


α
2
1−φk
φk
(
ψk(1−ǫ)
λe
)−α2
W
(
α
2
1−φk
φk
(
ψk(1−ǫ)
λe
)−α2 )

 , (36)
where W(x) is the Lambert-W function [43, Sec. 4-13].
To demonstrate the accuracy of R⋆e,k , log(1 + β⋆e,k) on
R∗e,k, we define ∆Re,k ,
|R⋆e,k−R∗e,k|
R∗e,k . Numerically, we obtain
∆Re,1 = 0.0462 when M1 = 4, and ∆Re,1 = 0.0062 when
M1 = 20. This suggests that R⋆e,k becomes very close to R∗e,k
for a large enough Mk (e.g., Mk ≥ 20).
Substituting β∗t,k and β∗e,k into (34), we obtain an expression
of T . Fig. 9 illustrates the network-wide secrecy throughput
T versus φ2 for different values of λe and M2. As expected,
using more transmit antennas always increases T . We observe
that, for a small λe, allocating more power to the information
signal (increasing φ2) improves T . However, for a larger λe,
T first increases and then decreases as φ2 increases, and even
vanishes for too large a φ2 (e.g., λe = λ1, and φ2 = 0.8).
There exists an optimal φ2 that maximizes T , which can
be numerically calculated by taking the maximum of T . We
also observe that the optimal φ2 decreases as λe increases,
i.e., more power should be allocated to the artificial noise to
achieve the maximum T .
From the analysis in previous sections, we find that the
access threshold triggers a non-trivial tradeoff between link
quality and network-wide secrecy throughput. On one hand,
setting a small access threshold improves spatial reuse by
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enabling more communication links per unit area, potentially
increasing throughput; setting a small access threshold also
benefits secrecy since more BS are activated increasing arti-
ficial noise to impair eavesdroppers. On the other hand, the
additional amount of interference caused by the increased
concurrent transmissions (a small value of τ ) degrades ongoing
legitimate transmissions, decreasing the probability of suc-
cessfully connecting the BS-UE pairs. In this regard, neither
too large nor too small an access threshold can yield a high
secrecy throughput. As shown in Fig. 10, T first increases and
then decreases as τ increases. Only by a proper choice of the
access threshold, can we achieve a high network-wide secrecy
throughput.
In view of the quasi-concavity of T w.r.t. τ indicated in Fig.
10, we can seek out the optimal τ that maximizes T using
the gold section method3. Furthermore, combined with the
asymptotic analysis on P intc,k in Sec. III-C and the expression
of P ints,k in (33), we directly provide the following asymptotic
behaviors of T as τ goes to zero and as τ goes to infinity:
1) When all tiers share the same values of M and φ, and
λu ≫ λj , ∀j ∈ K, T converges to a constant value as τ → 0;
2) T → 0 as τ →∞.
Fig. 11 compares the network-wide secrecy throughput
obtained under the optimal access threshold with that under
a non-threshold policy [37]. Obviously, our threshold-based
policy significantly improves the secrecy throughput perfor-
mance of the HCN. We also observe that deploying more
picocells still benefits network-wide secrecy throughput, even
through it increases network interference. This is because of
cell densification and the fact that the increased interference
also degrades the wiretap channels.
A. Average User Secrecy Throughput
Given that each BS adopts TDMA with equal time slots
allocated to the associated UEs in a round-robin manner, here
we investigate the average user secrecy throughput, which is
3Due to the complicated expression of T w.r.t. τ , more efficient methods
for optimizing τ will be left for future research.
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defined as
Tu,k , TkNk , (37)
where Tk , Ak̺
[
R∗t,k −R∗e,k
]+
denotes the secrecy trans-
mission capacity of a cell in tier k, and Nk = λuλk Sk denotes
the corresponding cell load. From the perspective of a UE,
the network-wide secrecy throughput can be alternatively
expressed as
Tu =
∑
k∈K
λuTu,kSk. (38)
By substituting (37) into (38), we see that Tu = T , which is
also as expected.
A UE may be interested in the minimum level of secrecy
throughput it can achieve. To this end, we evaluate the
minimum average secrecy throughput over all tiers, which is
defined as
Tmin , min
k∈K
Tu,k. (39)
Fig. 12 shows how Tmin depends on M1, λu, and λe, respec-
tively. Obviously, average user secrecy throughput deteriorates
as the density of Eves increases. This is ameliorated by adding
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Fig. 12. Minimum secrecy throughput per user in a 2-tier HCN vs. M1 for
different λu’s and λe’s, with α = 4, {P1, P2} = {30, 10}dBm, M2 = 4,
λ1 =
1
pi4002m2
, λ2 = 2λ1, {φ1, φ2} = {0.5, 0.5}, τ = −60dBm, ̺ =
0.95, and ǫ = 0.95.
more transmit antennas at BSs. In addition, as λu increases,
the number of UEs sharing limited resources increases, which
results in a decrease in per user secrecy throughput.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper comprehensively studies the PLS of HCNs where
the locations of all BSs, UEs and Eves are modeled as
independent homogeneous PPPs. We first propose a mobile
association policy based on the truncated ARSP and derive the
tier association and BS activation probabilities. We then ana-
lyze the connection and secrecy probabilities of the artificial-
noise-aided secure transmission. For connection probability,
we provide a new accurate integral formula as well as an
analytically tractable expression for the interference-limited
case. For secrecy probability, we obtain closed-form expres-
sions for both upper and lower bounds, which are approximate
to the exact values at the high secrecy probability regime.
Constrained by the connection and secrecy probabilities, we
evaluate the network-wide secrecy throughput and also the
minimum secrecy throughput per user. Numerical results are
presented to verify our theoretical analysis.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a typical UE Uo, we know from (2) and (4) that
Uo is associated with tier k only when rk ≤ Dk and Pˆk >
Pˆj , ∀j ∈ K \ k simultaneously hold. Therefore, Sk can be
calculated as
Sk =
∫ Dk
0
∏
j∈K\k
P
{
Pˆk > Pˆj |rk
}
frk(r)dr, (40)
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where frk(r) = 2πλkre−πλkr
2 [35, Theorem 1]. The term
P
{
Pˆk > Pˆj |rk
}
can be calculated as
P
{
Pˆk > Pˆj |rk
}
(c)
= P
{
rj > min
{
Dj , (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α rk
}
|rk
}
(d)
= P
{
rj > (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α rk
}
= P
{
No BS in tier j is inside B
(
o, (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α rk
)}
(e)
= e−πλj(Pj,kMj,k)
δr2k , (41)
where (c) follows from the fact that Pˆk > Pˆj holds if rj > Dj
or
PjMj
rαj
< PkMkrα
k
⇒ rj > (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α rk, (d) holds for
Dj =
(
PjMj
τ
) 1
α
= (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α Dk ≥ (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α rk, and
(e) is obtained from the basic nature of PPP [36]. Substituting
(41) into (40) and calculating the integral, we complete the
proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Without lose of generality, we consider a tagged BS Bz,k.
Let Φou , Φu
⋂B(z,Dk), and the BS idle probability of tier
k, i.e., the complementary probability A¯k , 1 − Ak, can be
calculated as follows
A¯k = EΦu

 ∏
x∈Φou
P{Ux is not associated with Bz,k}


= EΦu

 ∏
x∈Φou
P
{
PkMk
rαzx
< max
j∈K
Pˆj
}
(f)
= EΦu

 ∏
x∈Φou
1− e−πΞ(PkMk)−δr2zx


(g)
= exp
(
−2πλu
∫ Dk
0
e−πΞ(PkMk)
−δr2rdr
)
, (42)
where (f) is obtained from (41) and (g) is derived by using
the probability generating functional lemma (PGFL) over PPP
[44]. Solving the integral term in (42) yields Ak = 1 − A¯k,
which is given in (7).
C. Proof of Property 1
Since Ak = 1− e−
λu
λk
Sk
, the first derivative of λok = Akλk
on λk can be given by
dλok
dλk
= 1− e−λuλk Sk
(
1 +
λu
λk
Sk − λu dSk
dλk
)
. (43)
Let Ψk , (PkMk)
δ
Ξ
(
1− e−πτ−δΞ
)
and thus Sk = λkΨk. We
easily see from (5) that Sk monotonically increases on λk,
which means dSkdλk = Ψk + λk
dΨk
dλk
> 0 ⇒ − dΨkdλk <
Ψk
λk
.
Substituting this inequality into (43) yields dλokdλk > 1 −
e
−λuλk Sk
(
1 + λuλk Sk
)
. By employing 1 + x < ex, we obtain
dλok
dλk
> 0, i.e., λok monotonically increases on λk. As λk →∞,
we have Sk → 1, and then λok → limλk→∞ λk
(
1− e−λuλk
)
=
λu.
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Define xp , (−1)
psp
p! L(p)Io (s), and xMk−1 ,
[x1, x2, · · · , xMk−1]T. Pc,k in (11) can be rewritten as
Pc,k =
Mk−1∑
m=0
ERk
[
e−sN0
m∑
p=0
(sN0)
m−p
(m− p)! xp
]
. (44)
Due to the independence of Iio and Ijo for i 6= j, the
Laplace transform of Io is given by
LIo (s) = EIo
[
e−sIo
]
=
∏
j∈K
LIjo (s). (45)
Let rjo , (Pj,kMj,k)
1
α Rk and Pjz ,
φjPj
(|hTzowz|2 + ξj‖hTzoWz‖2). Using [22, (8)], LIo(s)
can be calculated as
LIo (s) =
∏
j∈K
EΦj

exp

−s ∑
z∈Φoj\B(o,rjo)
Pjzr
−α
zo




= exp

−π∑
j∈K
λoj
∫ ∞
r2jo
(1−̟ (Pjz)) dr

 , (46)
where ̟(Pjz) =
∫∞
0
e−sxr
−α
fPjz (x)dx can be obtained by
invoking fPjz (x) in [29, Lemma 1]
̟(Pjz) =


(
1 + ωr−
α
2
)−Mj
, ξj = 1,
(1−ξj)1−Mj
1+ωr−
α
2
−
Mj−2∑
n=0
ξj(1−ξj)1−Mj+n(
1+ξjωr
−α
2
)n+1 , ξj 6= 1.
(47)
with ω , φjPjs. Next, we calculate L(p)Io (s). We consider
the case φj 6= 1Mj , and the results for φj = 1Mj can be easily
obtained in a similar way. We present L(p)Io (s) in the following
recursive form
L(p)Io (s) = π
∑
j∈K
λoj
p−1∑
i=0
(
p− 1
i
)
(−1)p−i
(1− ξj)Mj−1L
(i)
Io
(s)×
{∫ ∞
r2jo
(
(p− i)! (φjPjr−α2 )p−i(
1 + ωr−
α
2
)p−i+1 −
Mj−2∑
n=0
ξj(n+ p− i)!
(
ξjφjPjr
−α2
)p−i
n!(1− ξj)−n
(
1 + ξjωr−
α
2
)n+p−i+1
)
dr
}
. (48)
Using the variable transformation r−α2 → v, and plugging
L(p)Io (s) into xp, we have for p ≥ 1
xp =
p−1∑
i=0
{
p− i
p
∑
j∈K
πδλojω
p−i
(1− ξj)Mj−1
∫ r−αjo
0
(
vp−i−δ−1
(1 + ωv)p−i+1
−
Mj−2∑
n=0
(
n+ p− i
n
)
ξp−i+1j (1− ξj)nvp−i−δ−1
(1 + ξjωv)n+p−i+1
)
dv
}
xi.
(49)
Calculating (49) with [45, (3.194.1)], and after some algebraic
manipulations, xp can be given as
xp = R
2
k
p−1∑
i=0
p− i
p
gp−ixi, (50)
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where gi , πδi−δ
∑
j∈K λ
o
j (Pj,kMj,k)
δ
(
φjPj
rαjo
s
)i
Qj,i, with
Qj,i given in (16). x0 in (50) is calculated as
x0 = LIo(s) = exp
(
− π
∑
j∈K
λoj×(∫ ∞
0
(1−̟(Pjz)) dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ij1(s)
−
∫ r2jo
0
(1−̟(Pjz)) dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ij2(s)
))
. (51)
Ij1(s) can be directly obtained from [22, (8)], i.e.,
Ij1(s) =


ωδCα,Mj+1, ξj = 1,
ωδCα,2
(1−ξj)Mj−1 −
Mj−2∑
n=0
ωδξ1+δj Cα,n+2
(1−ξj)Mj−1−n , ξj 6= 1.
(52)
Ij2(s) can be derived by invoking̟(Pjz) in (47). Specifically,
when ξj = 1,
Ij2(s) = r2jo

1− δ 2F1
(
Mj ,Mj + δ;Mj + δ + 1;− r
α
jo
ω
)
(Mj + δ) (ωr
−α
jo )
Mj

 ,
(53)
and when ξj 6= 1,
Ij2(s) = r2jo
[
1− δ
(
2F1
(
1, δ + 1; δ + 2;−(ωr−αjo )−1
)
(1 + δ) (1− ξj)Mj−1(ωr−αjo )−1
−
Mj−2∑
n=0
2F1
(
n+ 1, n+ 1 + δ;n+ 2 + δ;−(ξjωr−αjo )−1
)
(n+ 1+ δ) (1− ξj)Mj−1−n
(
ξjωr
−α
jo
)n
)]
.
(54)
Having obtained a linear recurrence form for xp in (50),
similar to [40], xMk can be given by
xMk−1 =
Mk−1∑
i=1
R2ik x0G
i−1
Mk−1gMk−1, (55)
where gMk and GMk have the same forms as those in [40].
From [40, (39)], we haveGi−1Mk−1gMk−1 = 1i!ΘiMk(2 : Mk, 1),
where ΘiMk(2 : Mk, 1) represents the entries from the second
to the Mk-th row in the first column of ΘiMk , with ΘMk
shown in (15). Then xp can be expressed as
xp =
Mk−1∑
i=0
R2ik x0
1
i!
ΘiMk (p+ 1, 1), (56)
and consequently, Pc,k can be given by
Pc,k =
Mk−1∑
m=0
m∑
p=0
Mk−1∑
i=0
ERk
[
x0
e−sN0R2ik Θ
i
Mk
(p+ 1, 1)
(m− p)!i!(sN0)p−m
]
.
(57)
To calculate the above expectation, we give the PDF of Rk in
the following lemma
Lemma 3: The PDF of Rk is given by
fRk(x) =
{
2πλk
Sk x exp
(
−πΞ (PkMk)−δ x2
)
, x ≤ Dk,
0, x > Dk.
(58)
Proof: The result for x ≤ Dk is obtained from [37,
Lemma 3], while that for x > Dk is an immediate conse-
quence of (2).
Averaging over Rk using (58) completes the proof.
E. Proof of Corollary 1
For the interference-limited case where N0 = 0, (57) can
be simplified as
P interc,k =
Mk−1∑
m=0
Mk−1∑
i=0
ERk
[
1
i!
x0R
2i
k Θ
i
Mk
(m+ 1, 1)
]
, (59)
which can be alternatively expressed in the following form
using the L1 induced matrix norm,
P interc,k =
Mk−1∑
i=0
ERk
[∥∥∥∥ 1i!x0R2ik ΘiMk
∥∥∥∥
1
]
. (60)
Averaging over Rk using (58) completes the proof.
F. Proof of Properties 2-5
i. Proof of Property 2: For the case {Mj} =M , {φj} = φ
and λu ≫ λj , ∀j ∈ K, Aj → 1 as τ → 0; Υk and ΘMk can
be re-expressed as Υk = Ξ(PkM)δ Υ˜0, andΘMk =
Ξ
(PkM)δ
Θ˜M ,
where both Υ˜0 and Θ˜M are independent of Pj , λj and k. Since
Dk → ∞ as τ → 0, by omitting the term
∑m
l=0
πle−πΥkD
2
k
l!D−2lk Υ
−l
k
from (18) and substituting in Υk, ΘMk along with Sǫ=0k =
λk(PkM)
δ
Ξ , we obtain
P int,ǫ=0c,k =
M−1∑
m=0
1
πmΥ˜m+10
∥∥∥Θ˜mM∥∥∥
1
, ∀k ∈ K (61)
which is obviously independent of Pj , λj and k.
ii. Proof of Property 3: To complete the proof, we first give
the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For the interference-limited HCN, the UCP of a
typical UE associated with tier k satisfies
P int,Bc,k (βt) ≤ P intc,k ≤ P int,Bc,k (ϕkβt), (62)
where ϕk , (Mk!)−
1
Mk and
P int,Bc,k (β) =
λk
Sk
Mk∑
m=1
(
Mk
m
)
(−1)m+1
Υˆk,mβ
(
1− e−πΥˆk,mβD2k
)
.
(63)
with the value of Υˆk,mβ equal to that of Υk at βt = mβ.
Proof: Recalling (11), since ‖hb‖2 ∼ Γ(Mk, 1), we have
P
{‖hb‖2 ≥ x} = 1−∫ x0 e−vvMk−1(Mk−1)! dv, which can be rewritten
as the form of 1 − 1Γ(1+1/t)
∫ z
0
e−v
t
dv with t = 1/Mk and
z = xMk . Then according to Alzer’s inequality [41], we obtain
the following relationship
1− (1− e−x)Mk ≤ P{‖hb‖2 ≥ x} ≤ 1− (1− e−ϕkx)Mk .
(64)
Substituting (64) into P intc,k = ERkEIo
[
P
{‖hb‖2 ≥ sIo}], we
can finally obtain (62) and (63).
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As τ → ∞, we have Ak → 0 for k ∈ K. Accordingly, we
obtain Υk = Ξ(PkMk)δ , which becomes independent of βt, and
so does Υˆk,mβ . This implies P int,Bc,k (βt) = P int,Bc,k (ϕkβt) =
P intc,k . Substituting (5) into (63), P intc,k can be finally reduced
to
∑Mk
m=1
(
Mk
m
)
(−1)m+1 = 1, which completes the proof.
iii. Proof of Property 4: Considering Pj,1 → 0, ∀j 6= 1, we
have Sj → 0 and Aj → 0, and accordingly Υ1 ∝ λ1A1,
Υj ∝ λ1A1P δ1,j , and
∥∥ΘmM1∥∥1 ∝ (λ1A1)m, ∥∥∥ΘmMj∥∥∥1 ∝
(λ1A1P δ1,j)m. We see that, both D1 and Υj goes to infinite
as Pj,1 → 0, then by omitting the exponential term from
(18), and combined with the above observations, we obtain
P intc,1 ∝ η1 , 1S1A1 and P intc,j ∝ ηj ,
λj,1P
2/α
j,1
SjA1 . From (5) and
(7), we can readily see that both 1S1A1 and
λj,1
SjA1 monotonically
increase on τ and λl, ∀l 6= 1, while decrease on λu, which
completes the proof.
iv. Proof of Property 5: Similar to the proof for Property
3, we have P intc,1 ∝ η1 and P intc,j ∝ ηj as Pj,1 ≪ 1. Since
P1 increases S1, A1 and P1Sj , we easily see that both η1
and ηj decrease on P1. As P1 → ∞, we obtain S1 → 1,
A1 → 1 − e−
λu
λ1 , and ηj → λ1A1M
−2/α
j,1 , and it is clear that
P intc,k , ∀k ∈ K, becomes independent of P1, which completes
the proof.
G. Proof of Theorem 2
Applying the PGFL over PPP along with the Jensen’s
inequality yields
Ps,k = EΦ1 · · ·EΦK
[
exp
(
− 2πλe×∫ ∞
0
P {SINRe,k ≥ βe|Φ1, · · · ,ΦK} rdr
)]
≥ exp
(
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
P {SINRe,k ≥ βe} rdr
)
. (65)
Let Ie = Ibe +
∑
j∈K Ije and κ =
rαbeβe
φkPk
, and we can
calculate P{SINRe,k > βe} as follows
P{SINRe,k > βe} = P
{∣∣hTbewb∣∣2 > κ(Ie +N0)}
(h)
= EIe
[
e−κ(Ie+N0)
]
= e−κN0LIe(κ), (66)
where (h) holds because U , ∣∣hTbewb∣∣2 ∼ Exp(1) is
independent of Ie. Note that, U is also independent of V ,
‖hTbeWb‖2 ∼ Γ(Mk − 1, 1) due to the orthogonality of wb
and Wb.
Similar to (45), the Laplace transform of Ie can be expressed
as
LIe(κ) = LIbe(κ)
∏
j∈K
LIje (κ). (67)
We first calculate LIbe(κ) as
LIbe(κ) = EIbe
[
e−κIbe
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ξkφkPkr
−α
be κvfV (v)dv
=
(
1 + ξkφkPkr
−α
be κ
)1−Mk
, (68)
where the last equality is obtained by invoking fV (v) =
vMk−2e−v
Γ(Mk−1) and using [45, (3.326.2)]. We then obtain LIje (κ)
from [22, (8)], which is given by
LIje (κ) = exp
(−πλojCα,Mj (ξjφjPjκ)δ) . (69)
Substituting (68) and (69) into (66) yields
P{SINRe,k ≥ βe} = e
−κN0e−π
∑
j∈K AjλjCα,Mj (ξjφjPjκ)δ
(1 + ξkβe)
Mk−1 .
(70)
Plugging (70) with κ = rαbeβeφkPk into (65), we obtain the lower
bound PLs,k as shown in (23).
Next, we derive the upper bound PUs,k by only considering
the nearest Eve to the serving BS. Given a serving BS Bb,k
and the nearest Eve Ee, PUs,k can be calculated by
PUs,k =
∫ ∞
0
P{SINRe,k < βe}frbe(r)dr, (71)
where frbe(r) = 2πλere−πλer
2 [35, Theorem 1] and
P{SINRe,k < βe} = 1− P{SINRe,k ≥ βe} can be directly
obtained from (70). Calculating the integral yields the result
as shown in (24).
H. Proof of Properties 6-8
i. Proof of Property 6: We obtain the monotonicity of ξk
and ψk on λe, τ , and φk from (33): 1) Both ξk and ψk are
independent of λe; 2) ψk monotonically decreases on τ and
φl, ∀l ∈ K\k, while ξk is independent of τ and φl; 3) Both ξk
and ψk monotonically decrease on φk; 4) ψk monotonically
increases on λu, while ξk is independent of λu. Combining
these results directly completes the proof.
ii. Proof of Property 7: Considering Mj,k → 0, we have
(1 + ξkβe)
1−Mk ≈ e−(φ−1k −1)βe and Aj → 0, then we obtain
1 − P int,os,k ∝ λe(Mk−1)λkAkCα,Mk . We can prove that
Mk−1
λkAkCα,Mk
monotonically decreases on Mk while increases on λk , which
completes the proof.
iii. Proof of Property 8: For an extremely large Pk, we
have 1−P int,os,k ∝ χk , λeλkAk and 1−P
int,o
s,j ∝ χj ,
λeP
2/α
j,k
λjAk ,∀j 6= k. We can easily prove that both χk and χj decrease on
Pk, i.e., each P int,os,j increases on Pk. As Pk → ∞, we have
Ak → 1−e−
λu
λk , such that P int,os,k tends to be constant. Besides,
we have limPk→∞ χj = 0, which yields limPk→∞ P int,os,j = 1.
I. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
i. Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting α = 4 and Mk = 2
into (33) yields P int,os,k (βe,k) = 1 − λe(ξkβe,k)
−1/2
ψk(1+ξkβe,k)
. Let x ,
(ξkβr,k)
1
2 , then we obtain a cubic equation x3+x− λeψk(1−ǫ) =
0 from P int,os,k (βe,k) = ǫ. Solving it with Cardano’s formula
[42] completes the proof.
ii. Proof of Proposition 2: Since limM→∞
(
1 + xM
)−M
=
e−x, we rewrite (33) as P int,os,k (βe,k) = 1− λeψkβδe,k e
− 1−φkφk βe,k .
Let 1−φkφk βe,k → x and e
α
2 x → y, and we obtain yy = eθ
15
from P int,os,k (βe,k) = ǫ with θ , α2 1−φkφk
(
(1−ǫ)ψk
λe
)−α2
. The
solution y is given by y = θW(θ) , which yields the unique root
β⋆e,k.
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